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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
charged with crimes a speedy trial. In the words of Justice Brennan, "the
speedy trial guarantee should receive a more hospitable interpretation
than it has yet been accorded."36
ALBERT G. CARUANA
VOTING RIGHTS: LIMITATIONS ON THE FRANCHISE
BASED ON PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
OBLIGATION BOND ELECTIONS
Pursuant to statutory provisions,' only real property taxpayers
were permitted to vote in an election to authorize the issuance of general
obligation and revenue bonds which were to be secured by property tax
revenues.' The appellee, a nonfreeholder, challenged the constitutionality
of this voting restriction and attacked the validity of the election. A three
judge federal district court declared the election unconstitutional, en-
joining the issuance of the approved bonds.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States held, affirmed: The challenged provisions of
the Arizona Constitution and statutes, when applied to exclude non-
property owners from voting for the approval of the issuance of general
obligation bonds, violate the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. 4 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
The right to vote in state elections, though fundamental, is not
expressly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.5 However, the
states are limited somewhat as to their power to establish voter qualifi-
cations,6 and limitations on the right to vote based on property owner-
36. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 57 (1970) (concurring opinion).
Subsequent to the writing of this note, the trend has been in the direction of the
establishment of court made rules of procedure which generally prescribe that the defendant
must be tried within six months of arrest. See, e.g., Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, 434 F.2d Advance Sheet No. 2 p. LI (1971). See also FLA.
R. CIEn. P. 1.191 (1971), which provides, among other things, that a person charged with
a misdemeanor be tried within 90 days from the time such person is taken into custody;
that a person charged with a felony be tried within 180 days from the time such person
is taken into custody; and that any person charged with any crime, upon demand, be
brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the demand.
1. ARIz. CONST. art. 7, § 13 and art. 9, § 8; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-523, 35-542
(1956); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-455 (Supp. 1969).
2. The general obligation bonds were to be issued to finance municipal improvements.
Under Arizona law, the city was legally privileged to use other revenues for this purpose.
3. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
4. The rule announced was to be applied prospectively only, but was applicable in
this case since the suit was brought within the prescriptive period (5 days) for challenging
the election pursuant to ARIz. REv. STAT. AN. § 16-1202 (Supp. 1969).
5. At the time the constitution was ratified, the majority of the states imposed
property qualifications to exercising the voting franchise. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUF-
FRAC,E IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1918).
6. The states are prohibited from discriminating because of race, U.S. CONST. amend.
XV; sex, U.S. CONST. amend XIX; or ability to pay poll tax, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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ship have frequently been declared unconstitutional.' At the time of this
writing, only thirteen states8 still restrict the franchise to property owners
in general obligation bond elections.
Two separate tests have been applied to determine whether voting
requirements are a denial of equal protection. Traditionally, the question
was whether there was a rational basis for the classification. 10 The
departure from the traditional view began with the 1964 apportionment
case of Reynolds v. Sims" wherein the Court stated that the equal
protection clause demanded that statutes denying the exercise of the
franchise to some and extending it to others must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized to determine whether they further a valid state
interest.12 The landmark poll tax case of Harper v. Virginia Board of
Electors3 was the first non-apportionment case to employ the broader
and more subjective "valid state interest" test to determine whether the
tax violated the equal protection clause.' 4 This stricter test was also ap-
plied in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15.'5
If a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some
bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies
the franchise to others, the court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.'0
7. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) ; Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
8. Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas and Utah limit the franchise to property
owners. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 213 n.l (1970).
9. For a detailed discussion of these two standards, see Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1133 (1969).
10. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), wherein the Court said
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any facts may be conceived to justify it.
By applying the "traditional test" the court concluded that Maryland's Sunday Closing
Laws did not violate the equal protection clause.
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Voters in several Alabama counties attacked the apportion-
ment of the Alabama legislature alleging it deprived them of equal protection of the law
under the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that representatives of both houses must be
apportioned by population.
12. See also, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) and Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
13. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the court declared
that
a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever
it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or
any other tax.
Id. at 666.
15. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). In Kramer, a thirty one (31) year old bachelor living with
his parents was denied the right to vote for the school board pursuant to New York law
which required an otherwise qualified voter to own or lease real property or be the parent
or guardian of a child in school. The United States Supreme Court held that the require-
ments were a denial of equal protection.
16. Id. at 627.
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Where the more stringent standard is applied, the franchise restric-
tion must promote a compelling state interest if it is to subordinate the
individual's right to vote. Though it was conceded that a state may under
some situations limit the franchise,'17 in the instant case, such a restric-
tion of the voting franchise was a denial of equal protection.
In a companion case decided the same day, Cipriano v. City of
Houma,'8 a Louisiana statute, 19 which limited the vote to property tax
payers in an election to approve the issuance of revenue bonds,20 was
found to violate the fourteenth amendment. Both Kramer and Cipriano
were explicitly limited to their facts so that the Court left unanswered
the question of whether the state's purpose in limiting the franchise to
those primarily interested is, itself, a compelling state interest.2 '
Two state decisions that followed Kramer and Cipriano utilized the
"compelling state interest" test to justify excluding those not "primarily
interested" from voting.2 In Muench & Taylor v. Paine2" nonproperty
owners as a class were held to be substantially less affected by the out-
come of a general obligation bond election than are property owners;
24
consequently, the class distinction was not violative of the equal protec-
tion clause. Similarly, in Settle v. City of Muskagee,25 a voting restric-
tion was upheld which limited the vote to property taxpayers who were
"primarily interested" and this promoted a compelling state interest.2 6
The question facing the Court in the instant case was whether a
state could restrict the vote to real property taxpayers in an election
to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds.27 In an opinion which
relied heavily on Kramer and Cipriano, these restrictions were declared
17. The Court conceded that there may be circumstances wherein a franchise could
be limited but failed to enunciate any such situation since the facts in the instant case
would not justify any franchise restriction. The author queries whether there could ever
be a circumstance where the franchise could be limited.
18. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
19. LA. STAT. § 39:501 (1950).
20. These bonds were for the purpose of improving public utilities. The Court reasoned
that since everyone used utility services, persons who do not own property are similarly
interested in the issuance of these revenue bonds.
21. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 n.5 (1969).
[Als in Kramer v. Union Free School District. No. 15, supra, we find it unneces-
sary to decide whether a state might, in some circumstances limit the franchise to
those 'primarily interested.'
22. The use of this test is unpredictable since the outcome depends upon how much
more of an interest one class of voters must possess over another before they are "primarily
interested."
23. 93 Idaho 473, 463 P.2d 939, (1970).
24. The court distinguished Kramer and Cipriano by stating that in the latter cases it
was not possible to say that the excluded class of voters was substantially less interested
in or affected by the election than the included class.
25. 462 P.2d 642 (Oklahoma, 1969).
26. The court conceded the fact that nontaxpayers are to some extent interested and
affected by reason of the city incurring indebtedness to finance a public utility, but this
interest was not "substantial" enough.
27. The application of Kramer and Cipriano to the instant case dictated a similar result
where nonproperty owners were excluded from voting for the approval of general obligation
bonds.
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unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. "The differences between the interests of property
owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently sub-
stantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise."2
Though real property owners may have a somewhat different inter-
est than that of nonproperty owners in the issuance of general obligation
bonds,29 the existence of this difference is no basis for assuming that non-
property owners will not be substantially affected by the outcome of the
election. Nonproperty owners will in effect also be paying a portion of
the taxes to finance the general obligation bonds through higher rents and
prices for goods and services.80
In the author's opinion, the effect of the instant case will be to
eliminate property ownership limitations on the right to exercise the
voting franchise. The question posed in Kramer and Cipriano appears to
be resolved. Limiting the franchise to those primarily interested is not a
compelling interest because "when all citizens are affected in impor-
tant ways by a governmental decision . . . the Constitution does not
permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens
from the franchise."'" The United States Supreme Court has yet to allude
to a situation in which limiting the voting franchise to a certain class
of voters might further a compelling state interest. Furthermore, when
applying the stricter "valid state interest" test to determine the constitu-
tionality of voter qualifications, most classifications will inevitably fall
since the excluded class of voters can usually show an interest in any
election and that they will be affected to some degree by the outcome.
SUSAN GOLDMAN
RESIGN TO RUN: A QUALIFICATION FOR
STATE OFFICE OR A NEW
THEORY OF ABANDONMENT?
The plaintiff, a Florida Circuit Judge whose term did not expire for
three years, intended to run for the office of Justice of the Florida Su-
preme Court. He was informed by the Florida Secretary of State, that
28. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
29. General obligation bonds may be described as a lien on property within the munic-
ipality since the issuers must levy sufficient taxes to service the bonds.
30. Several reasons were set out by the Court to show how non-property holders are
affected by the outcome of general obligation bond elections:
a. All residents of Phoenix are affected by this election since it is to finance public
facilities;
b. Although property taxes are initially paid by property owners, this expense is
passed on to tenants in higher rents and prices; and
c. Although Arizona law calls for property taxes to service general obligation bonds,
other revenues are legally available and will probably be used.
31. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,209 (1970).
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